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Feminist Lines of Flight from the
Majoritarian Subject

Tamsin Lorraine

Swarthmore College

Abstract
This paper characterises Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the
majoritarian subject in A Thousand Plateaus as a particular — and
inevitably transitory - manifestation of sexed and gendered subjectivity
emerging with late capitalism from the always mutating flows of creative
life and suggests that their notion of the schizo or nomadic subject
can inspire feminist solutions to the impasses posed by contemporary
forms of sexed, gendered, and sexual identity. Feminism can thus be
conceived as a schizoanalytic practice that fosters the kind of alternative
subjects for which Deleuze and Guattari call: subjects that move beyond
oppressive self-other relations towards a form of subjectivity that can
welcome differences as well as the differentiating force of life itself.
Keywords: Deleuze, Guattari, gender, feminism, identity, subjectivity.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in works they wrote separately as
well as together, present an ontology of becoming, a conception of
the modern subject of late capitalism, and intimations of future forms
of humanity with intriguing implications for feminism. Their ontology
posits humanity as a flux of always mutating becoming intertwined
with creative flows of non-human and inhuman life, and thus contests
essentialist views of women and men as well as a binary division
between the two. Their conception of the modern ‘autonomous’ subject
posits the latter as inevitably shot through with a multitude of social
flows in shifting configurations that can be mapped with respect to
specific locations in larger social wholes, and thus suggests a subject
produced through collective processes that we can better understand and
invites discriminating genealogies of gender in its imbrications with other
aspects of social identity. And their notion of the schizo or nomadic
subject dramatises possible ‘lines of flight’ from dominant forms of
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subjectivity, and thus inspires feminist solutions to the impasses posed
by contemporary forms of sexed, gendered, and sexual identity.
In what follows, I characterise Deleuze and Guattari’s conception
of the modern subject as a particular-and inevitably transitorymanifestation of sexed and gendered subjectivity emerging with late
capitalism from the always mutating flows of creative life and I explore
the implications of their conception for a feminist project of social
change. Although Deleuze and Guattari do not pursue this point the
way I will throughout this essay, sexed, gendered, and sexual identity
are central features of the oedipal subject, making the question of sexual
difference a crucial one, at least if one wants to endorse their project of
promoting schizo subjectivity as a project, as I will propose, of moving
beyond oppressive self/other relations toward a form of subjectivity that
can welcome differences as well as the differentiating force of life itself.

I. Oedipal Subjectivity and the Majoritarian Subject
According to the story Deleuze and Guattari tell in Anti-Oedipus,
oedipalisation as a psychic structure of human subjectivity arose in
the wake of capitalism’s deterritorialisation from the social systems of
meaning of previous cultures. Anti-Oedipus is in large part a critique
of psychoanalysis for further entrenching oedipal subjectivity rather
than (as Deleuze and Guattari propose) moving us beyond it, but
it is important to remember that Deleuze and Guattari ‘have never
dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus. Everything
points in the opposite direction: the subjects of psychoanalysis arrive
already oedipalized, they demand it, they want more’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1983: 121). Although they think that psychoanalysis gets the
unconscious wrong and has fallen for the ruse oedipal subjectivity
entails-that what the subject wants but cannot have is an incestuous
relationship with his mother (rather than, as they see it, to engage in
forms of desiring production that might unravel or revolutionise the
social status quo)-the oedipal subject characterised by psychoanalysis
is an ideal type of a fleeting form of modern subjectivity. This type may
be actually manifest in a relatively small number of instances given the
deterritorialising flows that undermine it as well as the vagaries of family
life, but it is a form of subjectivity whose further unravelling they hope to
promote. If the oedipal subject is the retrenchment of a more traditional
form of subjectivity precipitated by the frantic deterritorialisation
of capitalism, the schizo subject is a new form of subjectivity also
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precipitated by the deterritorialisation of capitalism - and it is the latter
subject that Deleuze and Guattari prefer to support.
Although sexed and gendered identity may appear to be primary
aspects of personal identity (checking off one’s race or religion may
or may not be required, but checking off one’s sex usually is), on
Deleuze and Guattari’s view, oedipal subjectivity obscures the multiple
social flows implicated in family life. Markers of difference that have
stable social significance in the territorial and despotic social formations
Deleuze and Guattari describe lose their credibility in a capitalist social
formation. Deference to abstract calculations of the market such as the
need for workers who can migrate from one workplace to the next
in keeping with the skills needed to produce the products that will
sell the best take precedence over the significance of concrete relations
with others in a variety of relatively stable social networks. Cultural
and institutional support for various identities is weakened by the
commodification of ethnic and cultural differences. The flows affecting
a subject’s life are organised around sexed and gendered identities
produced through a process of oedipalisation that requires constituting
oneself as a lacking subject and taking up a position on either side of
a sexual divide. Sexual difference becomes a crucial structural feature
in the psychic structure of a personal self who can negotiate the speeds
of capitalism without unravelling, but the flows affecting subjects are
social, economic, political, cultural, racial, pedagogical, and religious,
as much as sexed or gendered (see, for example, Deleuze and Guattari
1983: 274).
While sexual difference is important to the territorial and despotic
social formations Deleuze and Guattari describe, it is not personalised
in the form of sexed and gendered identity and sexual preference the
way it is in modern society.* According to Deleuze and Guattari’s view,
human subjects enter into polyvocal and multiple relations with their
world. A child is always making assemblages - pushing an ant along with
a stick, jumping in a puddle to see the water splash, blowing bubbles in
the milk to see them cascade over the sides. These assemblages unfold
not as expressions of the secret desires of a personal self, but through
body parts becoming the working parts of assemblages that connect with
the world in terms of their capacities to affect and be affected (air plus
throat plus milk in glass make bubbles that spill over). Oedipalisation
requires the subject to internalise the prohibitions of paternal law: to
regain a substitute for the prohibited mother (an incestuous relation
with whom, in some sense, comes to represent, according to Deleuze and
Guattari, engaging in unregulated desiring production with its immanent
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satisfactions), one must identify with the father and become an active
agent of the law he represents, or become the object desirable enough
to obtain passive access to phallic power. This produces a subject whose
desire is premised upon lack (one desires what one has lost and cannot
have until one lives up to one’s ego ideal) rather than upon the creation
of connections with the world that unfold creative capacities in living.
Internalisation of paternal law suppresses pursuit of the mutant
lines of deterritorialisation that emerge from the swiftly changing
circumstances induced by the incessant drive for profit, allowing relative
stability of the oedipal subject (if of a paranoid sort) despite the
breakdown in traditional codes in living and the habitual patterns of
life that actualise such codes. Barred from the creative transformation of
productive connection with the world, the oedipal subject of capitalism
maintains self-sameness with respect to interchangeable objects of desire
through repetition of personalised patterns of meaning and behaviour.
Her desiring production is restricted to fantasising the objects that once
acquired will give her the satisfaction she seeks. She is thus diverted
from engaging in the immanently satisfying production of machines that
would connect her in various ways to the flows around her (machines
that would extend her capacities and engage her in the kind of on-going
metamorphosis that makes subjects hard to pin down). The desire to
connect, make things happen, and extend one’s capacities and powers
to affect and be affected (the productive desire that constitutes active
participation in the creative diverging of life) becomes the private desire
of a personal self to obtain a substitute for an object of desire prohibited
by paternal law (where the latter is understood as the dominant
processes regulating social existence in its current configurations).
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation
of the modern subject de-emphasises the role of the family in the
production of oedipal subjectivity and elaborates the larger social flows
that resonate and affirm the constricted desires of a subject premised
upon lack. From the moment a child is born, she is immersed in
flows of signification and subjectification, and she enacts, through her
perceptions, thoughts, actions, and emotions, the habitual patterns
and orientations of her location on the social field with its particular
configurations of human and non-human flows. The subject emerges
from myriad routines and habitual patterns of living in which she
understands herself and what she says and does through meanings made
available by the practices engaged in at home, at school, at work, at
places of worship, at the doctor’s office, at court, and so forth, as well
as by multiple forms of cultural production ranging from network news
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and printed materials to video games and cinema. Deleuze and Guattari’s
notion of the faciality machine suggests that the triangulation of identity
with respect to sexual difference in the family is replicated and affirmed
with respect to multiple flows of the social field in a way that fixes
the subject on a ‘white wall’ of signification where she can always be
categorisable and plunges her into a ‘black hole’ of subjectification where
her psychic habits of self devolve into sterile patterns. Everyone must
submit to the dualism machines of subjectification, either identifying
their subjective experience with one of two opposing categories in a
series of opposing categories or being subjected to such identification
by others. A recognisable subject with a specific position vis-a-vis what
Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘majoritarian subject’ is thereby produced
‘depending on which faciality trait is retained: male-(female), adult(child), white-(black, yellow, or red); rational-(animal)’ (ATP 292).
The faciality function shows us the form upon which the majoritarian
subject is based: ‘white, male, adult, “rational,” etc., in short, the
average European’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292). Faces are pro
duced ‘only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases
to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional,
polyvocal corporeal code’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 170). Mutant
fluxes and flows of the body, for example, various forms of becominganimal, are no longer elements that are taken up into the socially
sanctioned organisation of human individuals. ‘Bodies are disciplined,
corporeality dismantled, becomings-animal hounded out’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987: 181). The complexity of embodied existence is reduced
to what can be captured and coded through the faces that are socially
recognisable (faces that show up on society’s white wall as readable)
and psychically convincing (faces that can be internalised as one’s
personal identity). Faces thus entail a reduction of one’s lived experience
of another human being in all her specificity to the selected perception
of another in terms of relatively fixed social categories of identity. They
also entail a personal psychic identity that comes to, in a sense, stand
in for the unrepresentable subtlety, variation, and ambiguity in the lived
experience of one’s own corporeality.
Sexed and gendered identities are crucial to the stabilising
identifications required by the faciality machines; taking up a definitive
stance with respect to a transcendent representation of desire separated
from the differentiating flux of life-the phallus as signifier of whatever
one might desire (with its implications of the passive or active
relation of the sexed subject vis-a-vis the likelihood of achieving
satisfaction)-renders the lines of becoming connecting one to the world
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imperceptible and thus totalises a self that can be ranked with respect to
the majoritarian subject. Forming a central identity as a woman or a man
with a specific gender identity thus entails a conception of self in relative
autonomy from the world who takes a passive or active desiring stance
with respect to that world. This division of humanity into two sexually
differentiated groups obscures a wide range of social investments of the
contemporary social field stratified into various configurations of power
by highlighting sexed identity as key to determining who one is and
how to live one’s life. A variegated range of differences among human
subjects is thus reduced in significance when compared to identification
with one of two categories, woman or man. This binary configuration
allows resonating patterns of binary identifications that situate subjects
with respect to the majoritarian subject in ways that clearly delineate
one’s position according to a relatively static social hierarchy.
At the level of the lived orientation of embodied subjectivity, each
subject, whether oedipalised or not, lives out her life as a unique
configuration of the concrete flows of physiological, corporeal, and
semiotic processes that inform her day-to-day life. How well this
orientation fits with the categories through which she is designated and
interpellated by the various practices she engages depends upon her
specific situation. No subject in contemporary society can escape dealing
with sex and gender categories in one form or another. Whether one lives
out these designations and interpellations in comfortable conformity or
painful dissonance depends upon whether the multiple forces converging
in the durations one lives resonate with dominant memory (that is, the
representational memories and history sanctioned by the mainstream) or
induce varying tendencies toward counter-memories and minoritarian
resistance. Furthermore, binary sexual difference turns out to entail
a form of subjectivity structured in terms of bifurcating categories
that valorise some subjects by marginalising others. Identification with
one or the other of two sexually differentiated positions (despite the
molecular connections subverting or complicating that identification)
is paradigmatic for other selections made from the faces of the
faciality machines. The active/passive dichotomies of sexual difference
are replicated in other social binaries with one identification of two
possibilities being always better or worse (that is, either closer to or
further from the majoritarian subject).
If a variegated range of social flows (from physiological and cultural
flows related to one’s able-bodiedness and race to economic and political
flows related to one’s class and political affiliation) become subsumed
under one’s sexed and gendered identity with respect to a familial story
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about sexual difference (one is a disabled woman or black woman rather
than a disabled or black human being; one is disabled or abled, black
or white, just as one is a woman or a man), then the latter will loom
large in one’s attempts to live a meaningful life. Troubling the waters
of binary sexed and gendered identities by revealing the complexities
subverting them as well as their imbrications with other aspects of
identity would thus appear to be especially threatening to forms of
subjectivity organised with respect to the majoritarian subject. If this
is the case, the feminist imperative to map sex and gender in relation to
other social designations could be said to be a project of mapping forms
of subjectivity structured in terms of their divergence from a normative
subject in order to explore and experiment with the possibilities implicit
in our present of a subjectivity that could welcome differences without
ranking them. Mapping subjectivity in terms of sex and gender from
this perspective respects the importance they play in orienting lived
experience in its contemporary formations at the same time as it fosters
lines of flight that could lead to forms of subjectivity that do not require
marginalising others.
n. Lived Orientations and Feminist Genealogies
Linda Alcoff, in an insightful essay on identity, argues that we need
to conceive identity as more than a category. Identity entails an
interpretative horizon that ‘should be understood not simply as a set
of beliefs but as a complex (meaning internally heterogeneous) set
of presuppositions and perceptual orientations, some of which are
manifest as a kind of tacit presence in the body‘ (Alcoff 2006: 113).
She cites George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work demonstrating that
the concepts we use in everyday life emerge from ‘largely unconscious
embodied conceptual systems’ (Alcoff 2006: 113). And she draws from
the phenomenological descriptions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone
de Beauvoir, Sandra Bartky, and Iris Young to indicate how a lived
orientation of the body in the world constitutes a kind of implicit
knowledge. On Alcoff’s account, identity is an orientation to the world
lived in the gestures, movements, and actions of the body at a nonconscious level as well as in the presuppositions, assumptions, and beliefs
of a linguistic orientation. Both together comprise an interpretative
horizon that grounds a subject in a perspective that is lived as her
own. Social identity is not simply the categories into which one fits, but
an interpretative horizon shared with certain others that affects what
and how one perceives. These identities are experienced in terms of the
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imbrications of social flows that converge in the various assemblages
through which day-to-day life is lived rather than the abstract categories
of identity to which people are often reduced. Identity is thus not
necessarily something that is inflicted upon one by others; it is an
orientation experienced as one’s own that emerges through participation
in collective patterns of corporeal and symbolic activity. This is why
claiming an identity through a rewriting of dominant history can be so
important. In articulating and asserting such an identity, a perspective
grounded in patterns of collective living experienced by a minoritarian
group is brought into conscious awareness and made the basis for an
alternative epistemological claim to that of the dominant culture about
the nature of social reality. ‘Real’ identity is thus, according to Alcoff,
experienced as an orientation grounded in often non-conscious patterns
of body, mind, and speech so habitual that they can appear (if they
appear at all) to be inevitable or natural.
What Alcoff calls ‘real’ identity is, from Deleuze and Guattari’s per
spective, the perceptual, cognitive, affective, and embodied orientations
of a subject sustained through the habitual patterns of physiological,
social, and cultural processes that constitute one as an embodied
human subject. Orientations constituted and sustained through organic
processes experienced in imbrication with the semiotic and corporeal
signifying and subjectifying processes of human living inform how one
experiences the world. If one’s corporeal and/or psychic anomalies are
such that one cannot take up positions with which one can identify
without dissonance, then one will experience a sense of discomfort, a
sense of not being at home in the world.^ This discomfort will deepen
if dissonance results in derogatory descriptions or exclusion. Subjects
marked in terms of their divergence from the majoritarian norm are des
ignated as somehow less entitled to other forms of social power. Unless
one can find alternatives, practices available to others as an extension of
their capacities into action in the world (of a more or less powerful sort)
will block one’s lines of becoming and decrease one’s power. Individual
and collective orientations suffer damaging marginalisation and uncom
fortable dissonance when they are subjected to faciality machines in
ways that mark their divergence from the majoritarian norm and block
potential capacities for affecting and being affected from unfolding.
When the lived orientations Alcoff describes as ‘real’ identity are
extended and elaborated in the minoritarian form of, for example, a
feminist gender identity or an antiracist raced identity, identity becomes
a form of self-naming that extends some of the lines of flight always
insisting in any subject in its divergence from the majoritarian subject.
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The faciality machines that designate either/or identity positions through
prevalent ways of speaking and patterns of activity that resonate with the
majoritarian subject attempt to cancel out the corporeal and conceptual
fluxes that would lead human subjects in their becoming to resist
the dominant patterns of signification and subjectification: you are a
man or a woman, you are black or white. Resistant identities are
identities in process-they create new identities rooted in fluxes of living
that continually vary from the dominant norm, refusing to let those
variations be assimilated to binary categories or their implicit tendencies
blocked from unfolding new ways of living.
Subjecting a range of evidence to abstract social categories like race
and gender tends to obscure the imbrications of social flows as well as
the ‘intensities’ (implicit tendencies that could unfold in new ways of
being) insisting in them. Understanding identity categories such as those
designating one’s gender, race, (dis)ability, or sexuality in terms of the
concrete situations in which they are used reveals the varying flows
that converge in the pragmatic contexts in which embodied subjects
are submitted to and/or identify with specific categories. Mapping these
flows with respect to one another allows one to see how various
flows of meaning produce identity categories inflected by the specific
forms social flows take in a given time and place. For example, Abby
Wilkerson’s mapping of erotophobia, in an essay using disability and
queer perspectives to explore continuities in the effect of erotophobia
on oppressed groups, shows how social flows can be coded in divergent
and yet mutually reinforcing ways. Wilkerson argues that a paraplegic
may be coded as asexual, an African American as hypersexual, and a
lesbian as perverted, but in all cases, the effect is to render the lived
experience of one’s sexuality less comfortable, thus blocking one’s power
in the world to a greater or lesser extent. She presents some examples of
how erotophobic judgements of the sexual behaviours or ‘natures’ of
members of various groups suggests that
[cjultural erotophobia is not merely a general taboo against open discussions
of sexuality, and displays of sexual behaviour, but a very effective means of
creating and maintaining social hierarchies, not only those of sexuality but
those of gender, race, class, age, and physical and mental ability. (Wilkerson

2002:41)
Medical literature that presents moralising restrictions on the sexuality
of the physically or cognitively disabled, hypersexualised images of
African American and Latino men, legal obstacles to the sexual agency of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people, the shame and alienation
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connected to the sexuality of heterosexual women that Sandra Bartky
discusses in her book, Femininity and Domination (Wilkerson 2002;
42-5): these are some of the effects of social practices that designate
certain bodies as deviant. From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective we
can say that it is through such practices that bodies and their desires
are delineated in terms of their distance from the majoritarian subject
acting as an orienting reference point (in more or less overt forms)
in those practices. Such delineation, through more or less subtle
approbation (a doctor who refuses to discuss birth control with a
disabled patient) or outright exclusion (laws against sodomy) renders
certain lines of becoming uncomfortable, dissonant, or impossible,
diminishing the power of those groups and their individual members
to affect and be affected in the process.
Feminists inspired by the Foucauldian notion of genealogy have
mapped various aspects of the social field to investigate how identity
designations have evolved over time, leaving legacies in the present
that might not be immediately obvious. If we look at some feminist
genealogies of race, for example, we discover not only a telling
resonance with Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of faciality and the
majoritarian subject, but how designations of the Eurocentric faciality
machines are implicated with capitalist and colonialist investments of
the social field, and how sex and gender designations intertwine with
race designations according to the configurations of forces of specific
times and places (see, for example, Lawrence 2003, McWhorter 2004,
and Warnke 2005). Other feminist genealogies show that sex and
gender are not only intertwined with race, but with other perhaps
less obvious (at least if you are closer to the majoritarian norm)
designations of cognitive and physical ability. For example, Anna
Stubblefield argues that the concept of feeblemindedness became linked
with ‘ “off-white” ethnicity, poverty, and gendered conceptions of a lack
of moral character’ (Stubblefield 2007: 162) in the eugenics movement
of the first three decades of the twentieth century in the US. The
eugenics movement was widespread and according to Stubblefield its
impact still influences scientific research and public policy. In her
investigation of how, in particular, ‘feeble-minded’ white women became
subject to coercive sterilisation, Stubblefield examines distinctions white
elites drew between the white race and other races; (untainted) whites
(supposedly) have the intellectual capacity to produce ‘civilisation’:
the development of agriculture, science and technology (in forms that
white elites recognize); sophisticated (according to white perception) cultural
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products such as literature, music, and art; and the development of
complex (according to white perception) societal organization and forms of
government. (Stubblefield 2007: 169)

Stubblefield cites research by scientists such as Paul Broca, Robert
Chambers, and J. Langdon Down, in the mid-nineteenth century that
investigated how to measure intelligence by first assuming that white
people were more intelligent than black people, and then, on the basis of
that assumption, construing differences between white and black people
as reasons for why white people were further along an evolutionary
path of ethnic types than black people. When Henry Hubert Goddard,
writing in the early twentieth century, described intelligence (understood
in terms of this model of ethnic evolution) as hereditary and impervious
to environmental influence, the stage was set for designating ‘heritable’
forms of white impurity (Stubblefield 2007: 172).
In 1908, Goddard adapted Alfred Binet’s intelligence test for use
in the United States by adding the category of ‘moron’ (designating
people with a mental age of eight to twelve) to the original scale that
included the ‘idiot’ (designating people with a mental age of two or
younger) and ‘imbecile’ (designating people with a mental age of three
to seven years). The notion that extreme poverty was hereditary and
linked to the moral defect ‘of a supposedly shameless willingness to
live on public charity’ (Stubblefield 2007: 173) was a widespread belief
that became increasingly linked to the concept of the moron in family
studies done in the early twentieth century. Feeblemindedness became
linked with ‘white poverty, off-whiteness, and lack of civilization
building skills’ and the ‘category of the moron - the feebleminded person
who appears normal but who is prone to immorality, incapable of
being a contributing citizen in a democratic society, and who will
pass feeblemindedness on to his or her offspring’ became ‘a powerful
device for drawing a distinction between tainted and pure white people’
(Stubblefield 2007: 176). In addition, white women who demonstrated
their failure to understand their role in the advancement of civilisation
by engaging in unchaste behaviour manifested, like impoverished white
women and off-white women, a ‘lack’ of intellect that tainted their
whiteness. Thus, intertwined constructions of race, class, gender, and
cognitive dis/ability came together in a conception of feeblemindedness
that ‘became gendered in a way that led to women bearing the brunt of
eugenic sterilization’ (Stubblefield 2007: 178-9).
‘Disabled’ subjects may be divergent enough from the majoritarian
norm that their disability becomes a salient feature of their designated
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identity. Even in such cases, however, their sexed and gendered identity
will be central to how that identity is interpreted and lived. Stubblefield’s
mapping reveals specific physiological, economic, colonising, and
cultural flows in the use of the term ‘feeble-minded’ that manifest
the imbrications of gender, race, cognitive (dis)ability, and economic
status in that designation in a way that belies the primacy given to sex
and gender in organising and understanding the converging flows of
concrete individuals. A wide range of practices resonate with familial
positioning in order to reinforce and naturalise distance from the
majoritarian subject. Maps like Wilkerson’s reveal the social investments
and configurations of power that such positioning conceals.
In addition to revealing the multiple forces that come together in one
designation of social identity, feminist maps reveal critical points in the
present where intensification of various sorts could result in significant
change. Thus, Wilkerson and Stubblefield’s genealogies reveal relations
of flows of which we may not have been aware that condition our
understanding of disability. Intensifying these connections in new ways
of understanding designations of disability and racial designations, as
well as the social practices related to them, could in turn lead to action
from within the relevant practices that shift them (to a larger or lesser
extent) into divergent forms of those practices or directly challenge
them (through discursive critique or some other form of resistance).
These genealogies, incomplete as they are, show how important it is
to understand how identity designations - be they those of sex, gender,
sexuality, race or otherwise - emerge and are interpreted in keeping with
specific investments of the social field best understood in terms of the
confluence of multiple forces of particular durations. The bifurcating
sorting of personal identity into yes/no categories obscures the shifting
vagaries of their evolution as they are put into effect in a multitude of
day-to-day situations. Although an emphasis on the personal identity
of an autonomous subject and the demand for clearly defined identity
designations tend to suggest that a given identity is a property of persons,
on Deleuze and Guattari’s view, identity is produced, reproduced,
sustained, and transformed through the unfolding of social life over
specific periods of time in particular places.
A designation of gender, race, or disability can never, from Deleuze
and Guattari’s perspective, be a static category. Its meanings inevitably
shift along with the faciality machines (as they are actualised in specific
patterns of meaning and activity) that enact it as well as the molecular
flows of lived orientations and identifications that resist those machines.
Such shifts are in response to the convergent forces affecting the
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relevant assemblages and will resonate with patterns organised around
the majoritarian subject or proliferate lines of flight. Words such as
‘disabled’ or ‘feeble-minded’ and the racial, gendered, and economic
connotations associated with them, leave traces in the present of which
we may be unaware, even if those specific words are no longer used.
Ways of speaking and doing become habitual patterns that self-replicate
even if in doing so they continually diverge from past repetitions.
Mapping an association among variations in cognitive style, skin colour,
financial income, and cultural practices of the duration connecting us to
an earlier time renders some of the relations now only implicit explicit,
making us more aware of the habitual patterns informing our naturalised
reality, and thus provide insight into how to shift those patterns in ways
we can support.
These genealogies track social practices that constitute subject
positions informing the categories through which people are designated
as well as identify themselves. These practices, from Deleuze and
Guattari’s perspective, are corporeal and semiotic assemblages that
tend to replicate and extend themselves, thus settling into stratified
configurations of power. Individual human beings with their personal
identities and desires emerge as individual solutions to the problem
of subjectivity from processes they collectively share in various ways
with others. Although sexed and gendered identity is a crucial feature
of dominant forms of subjectivity, these genealogies show how other
investments of the social field are equally, if not more, crucial. Even
when one’s personal identity is still experienced in terms of one’s sex,
gender, and sexuality (for example, one’s primary identification is as
a woman), these genealogies show the myriad social investments that
coalesce around that identity (it turns out a woman who primarily
identifies as a woman may be more likely to be relatively closer to the
majoritarian norm and so has not been confronted with other ways that
she differs from that norm-that is, she is a physically and cognitively
‘normal,’ white, heterosexual, middle-class woman).
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, modern subjectivity, insofar
as it is oriented with respect to the majoritarian subject, thus entails
organising multiple flows and investments of the social field in terms of
sexual difference. This structuring plays out through the oedipalising
function of the family and the faciality machines that confirm and
elaborate the binary structure of oedipalisation. Oedipalisation and
the faciality machines that produce the personal identity of modern
subjectivity thus operate not only to render the continuous variation
in human becoming that might extend into new forms of subjectivity
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non-productive, but also to turn collective stories about power
investments into personal stories about achieving meaningful lives.
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not themselves pursue this point, this
makes feminism an intervention that targets sex, gender, and sexuality as
a crucial fault line in modern forms of subjectivity that is just the starting
point for unravelling multiple configurations of power detrimental to our
collective unfolding.

in. Nomadic Subjectivity and Feminist Change
The deterritorialising of cultural codes precipitated by capitalism opens
human existence to an unprecedented amount of creative evolution by
releasing old constraints upon proliferating change. Thus, capitalism
actually enacts more of the differing and diverging becoming of life
and so, according to Deleuze and Guattari, on the one hand, puts
us in a better situation to become more aware of life as process, but
on the other hand, has produced a reterritorialisation onto oedipal or
majoritarian subjectivity, the reduction of productive desire to desire
premised on lack, and the incessant pressure to produce and consume.
The former tendency they align with their notion of schizophrenia and
a nomadic subject able to creatively evolve and the latter tendencies
they associate with paranoia and absolute systems of belief where all
meaning is, as Eugene Holland helpfully puts it, ‘permanently fixed
and exhaustively defined by a supreme authority, figure-head, or god’
(Holland 1999: 3). Thus, along with the high speeds of contemporary
life with its frantic pace of technological change and globalisation goes
paranoid reterritorialisation onto consumerism as well as fundamentalist
religion and fascist politics. Faciality machines are not universal to
human life; subjectivity in modern capitalism requires excluding more of
the corporeal fluxes running through any line of human becoming than
the other two social formations Deleuze and Guattari describe (although
this, in itself, does not guarantee the kind of desiring production
Deleuze and Guattari would like to promote). Rather than explore
possible connections among micropercepts and affects that could lead
to aggregates of perception and feeling that violate current opinion
and consensus representations of reality, faciality machines interpret
sensation as the meaningful experience of a recognisable subject. Rather
than pursue the physiological, social, and cultural permutations that
inevitably result from hybrid forces converging in particular locations,
faciality machines interpret anomalies as exceptions that do not affect
the norm or as exceptions that require new categories that resonate
with the system as a whole. This entails cancelling out subtleties

74

Tamsin Lorraine

in individual and collective experience and blocking exploration of
alternative connections.
Facialisation entails an embodied orientation organised in terms of a
personal identity. That is, all desires of the body are of one body with a
psychic self that is (more or less) unified with a coherent history that can
be represented and collated with the narratives of other members of the
community. Sexed and gendered identity forms an important fault line
of this self since it is through familial positioning with respect to sexual
difference that the multiplicity of social flows affecting subjectivity
are totalised in a self that is assimilable to the faciality machines of
capitalism. Personal identity, especially as it is regulated by the faciality
machines that percolate throughout the semiotic and corporeal practices
that insist on clearly delineated subjects with identities that fit into
already laid out parameters (to register for public school, I need to
designate age, sex, and residence; to walk into a restroom I need to know
to which sex my body conforms), becomes the organising reference point
for lived experience. If a lived experience cannot be referred to such
reference points, it may be unrepresentable and excluded from having
an impact (the knowledge I gain independently of a recognised school
may not gain me entry to the conference I want to attend), or it can
render lived experience either dissonant or unlivable (ambiguous sexed
or gendered identity can make life painfully confusing). But on Deleuze
and Guattari’s view, personal identity is not necessary for non-psychotic
subjectivity. Habitual refrains and some sort of constriction on desiring
production are necessary for relatively stable forms of human subjects to
be sustainable. But subjectivity is a self-organising system of becoming
with relative autonomy from surrounding flows grounded in a wide
range of territorialised processes that allow emotions, perceptions, and
day-to-day life to stabilise into habitual patterns. In a social formation
premised upon a lacking subject threatened with a loss of humanity
insofar as she or he breaks the rules (where the majoritarian subject
is the norm for what it is to be human and any deviation from that
norm is carefully observed and marked), unregulated refrains in living
are not allowed extension into new patterns. Productive desire must
be reduced to the lacking desire of a self still waiting to be completed (the
child’s desire to swirl water into dirt to make mud must give way to the
desire to be a chef or a scientist rather than simply to make connections),
and identity must be computed from the bifurcating patterns of social
recognition that select constants from a wide range of continuous
variation in order to plug those constants into already delineated rules of
living (a woman who is disabled must no longer be interested in sex since
she no longer fits the subject positions designated in countless narratives
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and scenarios emerging in multiple social practices about ‘what happens
when one is sexual,’ a mother who does not feel the kind of ‘maternal’
love for all her children depicted in various forms of cultural production
as well as assumed in social practices connected to childcare, pedagogy,
and citizenship must be an inhuman monster).
From a psychoanalytic perspective, immersion in a world of partial
objects where corporeal fluxes connect (or do not connect) in
immanently unfolding flows with surrounding flows where neither self or
other, subject or object, are points of reference is a psychotic nightmare.
Deleuze and Guattari present us with the provocative possibility that
desire does not have to be about what a personal self wants, but
could be about connecting with the world, making things happen,
and experiencing what happens in ways that defy subject/object and
self/other dichotomies. Self/other dichotomies obscure the physiological,
social, and cultural flows I share with others; I live at the same speed as
other organisms with similar configurations of processes (as I discover
in the assemblages I make with others) and the semiotic and material
assemblages that condition my individual speech and actions are often
the same. On Deleuze and Guattari’s view, a personal self or identity
as a totalised point of origin to which to refer all desire operates as a
kind of stranglehold on the individual and the capacities it could unfold
as well as the assemblages into which it could enter. By referring my
desires to a sexed self with a gender and a sexuality computed according
to the faciality machines, I block off intensification of other tendencies
insisting in me-tendencies concerning sense experience and perception
as well as emotions and beliefs - that could be extended into new ways
of living my subjectivity and new ways of connecting with my world
including the other subjects within it.
The famous case of John/Joan (who I will henceforth call by his
real name when living as the sex he ultimately chose, David) is a
sad example of how difficult it can be to live one’s humanity in a
social formation that demands a recognisable identity sorted through
the faciality machines.^ When a botched circumcision led to an anomaly
in organic sex (David’s penis was damaged beyond repair), a choice was
made to try and repress the anomalous range of continuous variation in
human organisms he manifested by surgically altering bim, designating
him as female, and concealing from him his initial status as male. Judith
Butler’s rendition of his story brings out the violence to which the people
trying to deal with his situation subjected bim. Although as he grew
older he refused to comply, he was submitted to practices designed
to remake him organically so that he would fit certain categories
(surgery and hormone therapy), as well as subjectively so that he would
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identify in particular ways (socialisation that encouraged him to engage
in ‘feminine’ behaviour such as cooking and playing with dolls and
interviews that encouraged him to have ‘feminine’ desires).'*
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, there was no true self
attached to either David’s ‘real’ sex (his clearly male body as it existed
before the accident) or his gender identity as it had been promoted
through subjectification procedures designed to create a female gender
identity (being identified and treated as a girl, being subjected to
interviews designed to elicit ‘female’ desires and so forth). David’s
flow of individuation involved a convergence of physiological, semiotic,
and subjectifying forces to which he-as a self-organising process of
subjectivity needing to navigate the practices of his social location - had
to respond in order to solve the problem of living a life. Although David
did achieve his desire to marry and have a family, his life was, by all
accounts, difficult, and he committed suicide at the age of 38. It is
impossible to know why he made the choice to end his life, but one
can imagine how painful dissonance between one’s lived experience in
all the molecular complexity of one’s lived orientation and the molar
subject positions designating one’s identity in a way that demands the
erasure of such complexity can become. His situation was anomalous in
a way that could not be easily cancelled out; he simply was neither male
nor female in the same way as his peers, given physiological anomalies
as well as anomalies in his socialisation.
Susan Stryker, a male-to-female transsexual who refuses assimilating
explanations of her actions (such as the explanation that she was ‘really’
a woman who simply needed to change her body to fit her true identity),
is a happier example of how anomalous gender identity can play out
in that she is able to intensify and extend her capacities to affect and
be affected by the world in ways that challenge the binaries of the
faciality machines. She speaks out publicly about her situation and she is
a respected member of a transgender community that challenges binary
designations of sexed and gendered identity. She thus defies erasure of
the range of continuous variation manifest in her particular actualisation
of humanity despite her deviance from the norm. She gives a provocative
challenge to those who would denounce her and her choices (in a
performance piece presented in, as she puts it, ‘genderfuck drag’ at an
interdisciplinary, academic conference)^:
I find no shame... in acknowledging my egalitarian relationship with
non-human material Being; everything emerges from the same matrix of
possibilities.... [T]he Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not trust
it to protect you from what I represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks
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the groundlessness of the privilege you seek to maintain for yourself at my
expense. You are as constructed as me; the same anarchic Womb has birthed
us both. (Stryker 1999)

David and Stryker both, in different ways, resist the faciality machines
that would recuperate their inassimilable differences to binary categories
of designation and interpellation. If David had difficulties in identifying
with the categories assigned him (when he was forced to identify as
a girl despite his lived dissonance with that designation) as well as
the categories he finally chose (by choosing to identify as male upon
discovering some of what had been hidden from him about the story
of his life), it was not because he wanted to challenge traditional
notions of sex and gender. What he wanted was to live a meaningful
life. What his story shows, perhaps, is how important a sense of
self that coheres with one’s lived orientations is to making one’s life
meaningful and therefore livable. We want to connect with the world,
affect and be affected, in ways that resonate with a self-understanding
and life narrative that makes sense to us, whether or not that sense
of self is conventional or dissonant. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms,
we might say that subjects need to extend not only their embodied
capacities to make things happen, but also their psychic, cognitive, and
emotional capacities to make sense of how they fit into larger wholes.
David’s lived experience was too dissonant for a number of reasons
(anatomical, hormonal, cultural, familial) to easily fit into social patterns
of making sense-ways of speaking, interpreting, and behaving available
to him through collective practices of the social field dictating intelligible
behaviour and interpretations - making it difficult for him to feel worthy
as a human being.
Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation of subjectivity posits a subject
who emerges from collective physiological and social processes as an
individual process in its own right by sustaining habitual patterns
distinguishing it as an individual from other processes around it.
As a specific formation of physiological, social, and linguistic matter
with actualised capacities - replete with hidden potential and tendencies
structured by virtualities that are part of the wider non-human as
well as human field conditioning its becoming-the subject is able to
affect as well as be affected by what is around it. But its separation is
always provisional, its form always on the verge of differentiating into
something else, and the actualisation of its capacities always dependent
upon the actualities and intensities that it is and with which it comes into
contact.
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Nomadic subjects emerge from collective patterns of living with the
configuration of social and non-human forces unique to the becoming of
specific processes of individuation. The individuation of such subjects
cannot be represented. It emerges as a lived orientation constituting
one’s perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and perspectives through the
territorialisations of unique individuations and communities grounded
in the material reality of shared patterns of living. Some orientation
with respect to the identity designations of mainstream social practices
is necessary for subjectivity. One’s ‘personal’ identity can be thought in
terms of the ‘molar’ designations of the faciality machines that enable
negotiation of dominant social systems of meaning or in terms of
lived orientations too subtle to be captured through such designations,
but which one could choose to assert by naming them. Heightened
awareness of converging flows and the habitual patterns that orient
one along with a sense of one’s own location and places to intervene
in order to affect individual and collective forms of self-production
could allow resolution of the dissonance often arising between the two
forms of identity as well as enable collective compositions that enhance
mutually joyful becoming. Nomadic subjectivity as an alternative to
oedipal subjectivity invites us to engage in a dynamic process of
self-naming rather than reduce ourselves to static self-representations.
Identity designations are representations that do not capture the nuances
of lived orientations and can block lines of flight by putting people
in opposition with one another despite the orientations they share.
Drifting from the identity designations of faciality machines in order
to experiment with joyful connections entails relinquishing some of the
control derived through representational intelligence with its penchant
for categorisation in order to trust the affective guidance of intuitive
insight into processes of becoming. Becoming more aware of how
one’s subjectivity is produced allows one to participate more actively
in one’s self-production, develop skilful ways to synchronise becoming
with others, and deterritorialise from identity designations in order to
unfold new solutions to the problems life poses. Flexible living entails
individual deterritorialisation from personal identity as well as collective
deterritorialisations from majoritarian subjectivity. A politics influenced
by Deleuze and Guattari would investigate different durations, the
mutually reinforcing reference points of the faciality machines among
those durations, and the places where intensification of virtual tendencies
might unfold new answers to how to live together.
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of human subjectivity emphasises
its continuity with the inhuman force of creative life. This emphasis
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fosters working with rather than against the differentiating forces of life
of which we are a part. This ontology conceives individual human beings
as singular individuals who more or less diverge from the flows of life
currently sustaining themselves in the recognisably human forms with
which we are familiar. The question of one’s humanity thus shifts from
that of measuring up to an essential form of humanity (with respect
to which many are found wanting) to the question of what diverging
flows of humanity we want to foster in the inevitably diverging and
differentiating flux of human life. Shifting the question in this way
has practical impact on identity questions key to feminist thought.
Women, as well as others who are ‘other’ to the paradigmatic subject
of contemporary culture, have been denigrated for somehow failing to
measure up to an ideal norm of what it means to be human. But such a
norm assumes an ontology where the form one’s humanity takes may
well count as a deviation. One strategy of feminism, understandably
enough, has been to contest what that essence is in order to make room
for women. Shifting to an ontology of becoming suggests a different kind
of strategy. If what it means to be human is not fixed, if human becoming
entails creative evolution - if what it means to be human consists in the
specific forms humanity actually takes and could unfold rather than a
human essence that is then instantiated more or less well-then what
feminists need to do is map where we are in order to find the best
places to intervene and foster the human forms we would most like to
support. The question then becomes not who we have always been and
always will be, but how to make the mechanisms that create subjects
and identities better function in keeping with our own becomings.
Feminism could be seen as an untimely schizo practice designed
to intervene with contemporary configurations of modern subjectivity
that involve suppression and oppression of subjects that deviate from
a majoritarian norm with the fault lines of sexed, gendered, and
sexual identity as its starting point. Deleuze and Guattari provide a
narrative about the formation and production of those subjects that
suggest critical points of intervention that could move us beyond binary
categorisation of sex and gender and the oppression it entails. By
distinguishing subjectivity as patterns of lived activity from faciality
machines that designate identity they give us a way of understanding
how we could be subjects without the binary designations that we
currently think of as crucial to being any kind of subject at all. But
they do not think we can simply choose to leave those binary machines
behind. Rather, they recommend carefully mapping where we are in
order to find vitalising paths that extend the tendencies resisting binary
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designations. And they suggest that rather than be paranoid about the
anarchic chaos we imagine moving beyond such binaries could cause,
that we consider the capacities we could unfold if we could open up
to the impersonal and inhuman flows around us. They present us with
alternative conceptions of subjectivity as relatively stabilised patterns of
physiological, corporeal, and semiotic activity that mutate over time in
keeping with the flows that constitute them and the flows with which
they come into contact, but which, as self-organising systems, and, in
particular, human self-organising systems with the capacity to intuit the
durational whole, can consciously participate in their creative evolution.
And while such participation does not entail the masterful control of
the autonomous subject as conceived by traditional modernity, it does
entail ways of being more skilful than others in coming into joyful
synchrony with the flows around it. Feminism, as a theoretical and
pragmatic process, can intuit ways of living our sex and gender that
are more affirming of the continuous range of variation in being sexed
and gendered becoming-human entails. By mapping where we are and
finding lines of flight from majoritarian subjectivity that can extend our
capacities in ways that synchronise with others, feminists, along with
other forms of minoritarian and schizo becoming, can promote a joyfully
collective and open-ended process of becoming-human.
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Notes
1. Deleuze and Guattari’s account is compatible with Foucault’s reading of sexed
identity as taking on new importance in the circulation of biopower and the
management of large groups of people emerging in the eighteenth century.
Whereas one’s sex in premodern times had significance in the role one would
play and the patterns of social living in which one participated, it was not key
to personal identity, on both these accounts, until the emergence of a modern
subject with its increasingly interiorised psychic structure (see Foucault 1978).
See Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals for an account of the interiorisation of
subjectivity in the context of Christianity that influences Deleuze and Guattari’s
account (Nietzsche 1989).
2. Sara Ahmed presents an example of an evocative phenomenological account of
how a queer orientation can precipitate such dissonance (Ahmed 2006).
3. ‘John/Joan’ was actually David Reimer. For more information on this case from
various perspectives, see Colapinto 1997, 2000, and 2004, Diamond 1997,
Diamond and Sigmundsen 1997, and Money 1997. I am particularly indebted
to Judith Butler’s provocative rendition of this case that brings out the problem
David posed to the people who responded to him by attempting to render him
intelligible from competing perspectives as a problem of a humanity that exceeds
intelligibility. On Butler’s view: ‘it is precisely the ways in which he is not fully
recognizable, fully disposable, fully categorizable, that his humanness emerges’
(Butler 2004: 73).
4. David’s situation was particularly contentious since there were at least two views
of who he ‘really’ was that were being promoted and contested. To oversimplify
what were more complicated and evolving positions over the course of a long
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debate, John Money, a medical psychologist and founder of the Gender Identity
Institute at Johns Hopkins University, thought gender identity was malleable and
hoped David’s case would prove him right (it helped that David had an identical
twin-the perfect complement to an experiment in manipulating gender identity
through socialisation) and Milton Diamond, a sex researcher involved in a long
standing battle with Money, believed gender identity had a hormonal basis. See
Diamond 1997, Diamond and Sigmundsen 1997, and Money 1997.
5. Stryker describes her outfit as ‘combat boots, threadbare Levi 501s over a black
lace body suit, a shredded Transgender Nation T-shirt with the neck and sleeves
cut out, a pink triangle, quartz crystal pendant, grunge metal jewellery, and
a six-inch long marlin hook dangling around my neck on a length of heavy
stainless steel chain’ (Stryker 1999: 2). There are, of course, social flows involved
in transgender identity that are the subject of heated discussion in feminist and
transgender debates that I do not here address.
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